Do Constitutional Courts care about Parliaments in the Euro-crisis? On the precedence of the "constitutional identity review"

The article assesses how and to what extent Constitutional Courts dealing with Euro-crisis measures protect or limit parliamentary powers through their case law. The article argues that constitutional case law regarding the Euro-crisis measures permit national constitutional identities to emerge in a more explicit way than in the past. In this respect, Constitutional Courts’ judgments are concerned with parliamentary prerogatives as long as the safeguard and enhancement of the democratic principle is considered part of the national constitutional identity and can prevail, in the specific case in question, over other supreme principles. In particular, two relevant elements may be identified. First, the case law of Constitutional Courts regarding Euro-crisis measures can be viewed on a continuum with past judgments, although the Euro-crisis law appears to have “forced” some Courts to elaborate more in their reasoning on the core and non-negotiable principles on which national Constitutions are based. Second, such an exercise in the constitutional reasoning has been triggered particularly by those Euro-crisis measures which are international and intergovernmental in nature and which have been adopted in the framework of financial assistance programmes. In conclusion, the protection of Parliaments through constitutional adjudication during the crisis is instrumental and is achieved only where it is so requested to preserve the constitutional identity